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Abstract 
Although the vitality of small private enterprises as the prime mover of the substantial 
economic growth in Wenzhou is widely recognized, empirical research investigating the 
development process of such private enterprises is useful.  Based on a survey of 
enterprises producing low-voltage electric appliances, we find that the entry of a large 
number of new enterprises producing poor-quality products was followed by the upgrading 
of product quality and the introduction of new marketing strategies.  Hence, we attempt to 
identify statistically the mechanisms underlying this evolutionary process of industrial 
development. 
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1.  Introduction 
     China’s substantial economic growth in the 1980s is attributable mainly to township- 
and village enterprises (TVEs) according to Chen et al. (1992), Jefferson et al. (1996), and 
Otsuka et al. (1998).  However, the private sector emerged as the new engine of Chinese 
economic growth in the 1990s.  The heartland of this private sector growth is Zhejiang 
Province, particularly in Wenzhou City as Zhang (1989), Nolan (1990), Dong (1990), Wang 
(1996), Li (1997), Zhang (1999) and Sonobe et al. (2002) attest.  Although Wenzhou used 
to be a poor rural area, it now ranks among the most prosperous cities in China due to its 
relatively rapid economic growth in the 1980s and its explosive growth in the 1990s.  
Initially poor farmers began to produce poor-quality consumer goods, e.g., apparel and 
footwear items, and sold them in major cities throughout China.  The label indicating that 
the product was made in Wenzhou became synonymous with inferior products.  With the 
rise in their income levels in the 1990s, consumers in China became increasingly fastidious 
about the quality of products.  Hence, enterprises in Wenzhou attempted to improve the 
quality of their products.  How these enterprises were able to upgrade their products and 
overcome their bad reputations to capture the national market is the topic of this paper.   
The development strategy pursued in Wenzhou is widely acclaimed, but few 
empirical inquiries have investigated how small and medium scale enterprises in Wenzhou 
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achieved such dramatic industrial growth.  We analyze the process of innovation and 
imitation in the industrial development in Wenzhou by using primary data collected from 
private enterprises in the low-voltage electric appliance industry.  Low-voltage electric 
appliances refer to products such as switches, wall outlets, and ammeters that are used 
mainly in houses, apartments, and office buildings.  In the planned economy period, these 
items were rationed and it was difficult to obtain replacements and parts.  Before the 
economic reform in 1978, this industry began in Wenzhou when a farmer produced simple 
parts using scraps from the factories of state owned enterprises and sold them illegally to 
factories and offices in Shanghai.  Schumpeter (1912) classifies this activity as a new 
combination so that this farmer should be considered to be an innovator.  In the mid-1980s, 
when a number of enterprises produced and marketed low-quality products despite 
increasing complaints from their customers, a few enterprises began to improve the quality 
of their products.  One enterprise actually introduced new marketing strategies, such as the 
establishment of a brand name and the development of a network of own sales throughout 
China, to overcome the bad reputation of Wenzhou as the homeland of inferior products.  
The introduction of these new strategies constitutes another innovation, which had a 
pervasive impact on the growth of the industry because it stimulated imitation by many 
other enterprises. 
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Recently, the evolutionary process of innovation and imitation in the economic 
literature has attracted much attention, e.g., Filson (2002), Gort and Klepper (1982), 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994a and 1994b), Klepper (1996 and 2002), and Klepper and 
Simons (2000).  However, few empirical studies are found in less developed economies.  
In this paper, we investigate the improvement of product quality, the marketing strategies 
for overcoming the bad reputation, and the diffusion through imitation by followers in 
Wenzhou.  We also explore the consequences of this innovation and imitation for the 
growth performance of the industry to understand the essence of the Wenzhou model of 
industrial development.   
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a brief conceptual framework.  
After the pattern of economic growth in Wenzhou is described, Section 3 provides details of 
the history of the industry, especially the process of improvements in product quality.  
Section 4 formulates the hypotheses and specifies the equations for empirical testing in 
Section 5.  Finally, we summarize our major findings and discuss implications for future 
studies in Section 6. 
 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
Until the mid-1980s, the quality of manufactured products was not a major concern 
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of Chinese consumers because most goods were in short supply.  In the planned economy, 
planners had little interest in the quality of building materials and components as long as 
the structures built did not topple; hence, builders used cheap materials and components, 
including low-voltage electric appliances.  As the transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy proceeded and as the income level of consumers rose, poor quality 
products became increasingly difficult to sell and it became profitable to improve product 
quality.  According to our interviews, an increasing number of low-voltage electric 
appliance enterprises in Wenzhou began improving the quality of their products in the late 
1980s.  Subsequently, enterprises introduced a mass production system to meet the rapidly 
growing demand for their products due to the booming construction business and the rapid 
electrification in poor rural villages in the 1990s.   
According to the literature concerning the effects of imperfect information on product 
quality pioneered by Akerlof (1970), an enterprise’s effort to improve quality may be 
fruitless due to adverse selection if the products having improved quality are intermingled 
with poor-quality products of other enterprises.  This literature suggests several strategies 
to avoid this problem, including the establishment of brand names, direct transactions with 
customers, and the use of sales agencies that deal only in the enterprise’s products.  If the 
brand name is virtually unknown to consumers, the producer who has just improved 
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product quality may not be able to command the high prices associated with high quality 
items until his reputation is established.  Shapiro (1983) assumes that the price p of a 
product is an increasing function of the level of quality P perceived by consumers whereas 
production cost C is an increasing function of both actual quality A and output Q.  Hence, 
profit is given by  = p(P)Q – C(Q, A).  Immediately after quality improvement, 
perceived quality P remains low whereas production cost has increased with the increase 
in the actual quality A so that the profit margin decreases.  Shapiro (1983) demonstrates 
that the optimal policy is to keep selling the improved product with thin profit margins for a 
certain period of time, which can be interpreted as an investment in reputation. Klein and 
Leffler (1981) show that high profit margins of enterprises with good reputations encourage 
them to maintain their reputations for the high quality of products. 
     We adopt the following conceptual framework to investigate quality improvement in 
the low-voltage electric appliance industry in Wenzhou.  Suppose that the products of all 
enterprises are equally poor initially, but that some enterprises succeed in improving 
product quality.  For these forerunners, a perception gap between P and A emerges 
leading to low profit margins even if these enterprises introduce signaling devices such as 
brand names and own retail networks.  As a result, sales volume does not increase in the 
short run in spite of the improved product quality.  However, consumers who purchase the 
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products of these enterprises revise their perceptions if the high quality is maintained and 
this information may also be communicated to other potential buyers.  The rapidity with 
which perception gaps are narrowed depends on sales volume, which will in turn depend on 
the price of the product.  As Shapiro (1983) indicates, quality-improving enterprises may 
reduce the price, and profit margins, intentionally to build their reputations for quality.  As 
the perception gap narrows, these enterprises earn high profits and begin to grow.  
Observing the success of such enterprises, an increasing number of other enterprises 
follow suit by imitating both the high quality products and the marketing strategies of the 
leading enterprises.  These followers may also imitate the production processes of the 
leaders to meet the increasing demand for high quality products.  Other enterprises that do 
not imitate the products or marketing strategies of the leaders are left behind.  However, 
since the range of the Chinese markets served by producers of electric components is vast, 
some enterprises may specialize intentionally in the low-quality segment of the market and 
target rural households with very low incomes.  Thus, our conceptual framework suggests 
that three types of enterprises, namely, leaders, followers, and laggards, will arise.   
Efforts to improve product quality represent partly a response to the declining 
profitability of producing simple, low-quality products and partly a response to the 
increasing demand of consumers for high-quality products associated with income growth.  
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Although statistical evidence on quality improvements of low-voltage electric appliances in 
the entire Chinese market is difficult to obtain, our informal interviews with enterprise 
managers in Wenzhou clearly indicate that competition on quality has intensified since the 
late 1980s.  However, the growing demand for high-quality products is exogenous to the 
enterprises in Wenzhou because it is determined by the rate of economic growth of the 
entire Chinese economy.  Although the demand for high-quality products would have 
grown gradually with income growth, quality competition began suddenly after the 
profitability of producing low quality products declined in the early 1990s.  Hence, 
internal economic forces stimulated directly the improvement of product quality. 
We conjecture that the managers in the leading enterprises are more educated than 
those in the other enterprises and that their prior experience in marketing influences their 
marketing strategy by the leading enterprises.  Such a link between innovation and 
experience is suggested by both historical evidence and recent case studies of industrial 
development.  Landes (1969) argues that the internal contradictions of the putting-out 
system in the proto-industrialization in England in the seventeenth century, such as the 
embezzlement of cloth and other material by domestic weavers, were overcome by 
merchants through the introduction of the factory production system because their 
experiences in selling and manufacturing alerted them to the possibility of this new 
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profitable production system.  Recent case studies of garment clusters in Hiroshima 
Prefecture in Japan after World War II and in Zhejiang Province in China for the last two 
decades report that new marketing and production systems were introduced to these clusters 
by former local merchants with relatively high education when inferior products were 
replaced with superior products (Sonobe et al., 2002 and Yamamura et al., 2003).  In a 
case study of the machine tool industry in Taiwan, Sonobe et al. (2003) reports that the new 
methods of production and marketing of numerically controlled machines were first 
introduced by two new enterprises with highly educated managers and that these new 
methods were imitated quickly by the experienced manufacturers of machine tools.  In the 
following section, we characterize the innovators and imitators in Wenzhou based on their 
educational and occupational backgrounds.  
 
3. The Process of Economic Development in Wenzhou  
    When the economic reform started in 1978, Wenzhou was densely populated but 
endowed with little arable land.  Poor farmers peddled miscellaneous low-quality, 
hand-made goods, such as leather goods, apparel, and footwear, to major cities.  Within 
Wenzhou, few state-owned enterprises were set up because Wenzhou is close to Taiwan and 
the financially weak local governments could not afford to establish TVEs.  However, in 
the early 1980s, a large number of small-scale red-cap enterprises emerged, which were 
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essentially private but disguised themselves as TVEs.  As Nolan (1990) asserts, private 
enterprises were important in the non-farm sector in poor areas with weak non-farm 
economies.   
     The local governments in Wenzhou did not simply permit free economic activities 
passively; they facilitated them by constructing several local marketplaces.  According to 
our interviews with the managers of long-established enterprises producing low-voltage 
electric appliances, the establishment of the marketplace for various metal products in 
Yueqing city, which is a lower-level city within Wenzhou city, reduced drastically the 
difficulties in procuring raw materials and finding buyers for their products.  In the 
marketplace, producers learn the ideas and designs of other producers and obtain 
information from outside traders on what products are selling in large cities.  The drastic 
reduction in search costs and the spillovers of valuable market information not only helped 
incumbents but also attracted new entrants, who were farmers, factory workers, and traders.  
Thus, the entry of new enterprises increased significantly after the construction of the 
marketplace in the early 1980s.  As a result, a cluster of enterprises producing similar 
products was formed in Yueqing.  Similar development processes took place in other cities 
within Wenzhou specializing in other products, such as garments, footwear, and cigarette 
lighters.  Thus, Dong (1990), Wang (1996), and Li (1997) argue that, although the major 
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characteristic of the Wenzhou model of development is the growth of private household 
enterprises, the role of specialized markets in facilitating transactions of parts and final 
products is no less important. 2 
     Friedman (2003) argues that to interpret accurately what is happening in China today 
requires a knowledge of history, particularly a history of cities.  Wenzhou has a long 
tradition of handicrafts and commerce beginning in the Sung period, even though it was not 
as prosperous as Ningbo, a center of long-distance as well as foreign trade, from which it is 
separated by a chain of high mountains (Shiba, 1968, 1977; Skinner, 1977).  Because of 
this tradition, this city was endowed with substantial human capital in the form of latent 
mercantile skills when the reform began and, consequently, it had strong potential for 
growth.  Indeed, this tradition led to active outmigration of Wenzhou people during the 
reform period, which has contributed to the formation of Wenzhou markets in various large 
Chinese cities and commercial networks between Wenzhou and those cities, including 
Beijing (Zhang, 2001).  Thus, the Wenzhou model of development, which depends on a 
network of Wenzhou traders working throughout China, may not be replicable.   
Nonetheless, rural-urban information and marketing networks created through migration 
play a key role in the development of rural industries in other parts of China (Murphy, 
2002) and also in other East Asian countries (Otsuka, 1998). 
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Figure 1 displays the trends of GDP per capita in China, Wenzhou, and Yueqing 
beginning in 1978.  Although GDP per capita in Yueqing and Wenzhou was 60 percent of 
the Chinese average in 1978, the three became equal in 1992 and GDP per capita in 
Yueqing and Wenzhou became twice the Chinese average by 1998.   Moreover, economic 
growth in Yueqing and Wenzhou accelerated in the 1990s.  Hence, economic growth in 
Wenzhou may be characterized as relatively rapid in the 1980s and explosive in the 1990s.  
To investigate the factors behind this growth and its acceleration, we turn to the results of 
our enterprise survey. 
     In May 2000, we conducted informal interviews with managers of the two largest 
enterprises producing low-voltage electric appliances and nine other enterprises producing 
garments, footwear, and cigarette lighters in Wenzhou.3 After this survey, we decided to 
focus on the low-voltage electric appliance industry and conducted a second wave of 
personal interviews with eight enterprise managers, including the initiator of this industry, 
in December 2000.  Based on these interviews, we designed questionnaires, pretested 
them, and conducted a formal survey of 117 enterprises producing finished products and 90 
enterprises producing parts in Yueqing city from May to December 2001.  In this paper, 
we analyze the data for enterprises producing finished products and leave the analysis of 
parts suppliers to future study.4  We obtained data on production and costs in 1990, 1995, 
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and 2000, as well as various characteristics of the enterprises, their founders, and their 
current managers.  We eliminated five enterprises from the analysis because their 
production and cost data were either incomplete or highly suspicious.  Thus, the sample 
consists of 112 enterprises, all of which were active at the time of our survey.   
     Table 1 displays the number of sample enterprises, the average years of schooling of 
the founders, and the percentage composition of their occupational backgrounds at the time 
of their entry into the industry.  The industry began in 1973 and the number of new 
entrants increased dramatically in the early 1980s when the first marketplace was 
constructed.  The years of schooling of the founders increased gradually along with the 
increase in the average education level in Wenzhou.  However, the occupational 
backgrounds of the entrants changed drastically.  The proportion of farmers was high 
among the early entrants and that of factory workers was high in the early 1980s, 
suggesting that prior knowledge of marketing and engineering was not an entry requirement 
in the early stage of development.5  In the later periods, the proportion of these 
occupations declined as the majority of new entrants were salesmen and traders, which is 
characteristic of merchant-led industrial development, in which merchants are 
entrepreneurs.6 
     Table 2 reports the changes in the number of sample enterprises and the average size 
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of production.  In the late 1990s, enterprise groups were formed through mergers as was 
common in many other industries in China.7 Of the 112 sample enterprises, 28 enterprises 
were registered as groups by 2000 and the largest group had about 70 subsidiaries.  
Reflecting the formation of groups, an increasing number of sample enterprises became 
subsidiaries; the number of subsidiaries in the sample was zero in 1990, six in 1995, and 39 
in 2000.8  At the same time, a large number of enterprises left the industry in the late 
1990s because their management was too inefficient to be reformed.  As a result, the 
number of independent enterprises in the sample, excluding subsidiaries, increased from 66 
to 94 in the early 1990s and decreased to 73 in the late 1990s.   
     Most conspicuous in Table 2 is the explosive expansion of the average size of 
enterprise in the late 1990s, which is in a sharp contrast to its moderate growth during the 
first half of the 1990s.  Moreover, the data on production refer only to the core or parent 
enterprises in the case of enterprise groups.  If the subsidiaries of the sample enterprises 
were included and the total sizes measured by the sum of real value added, the average size 
of the sample enterprises in 2000 would be about 1.6 times as large as shown in the table.  
Thus, the late 1990s is a period of drastic expansion of enterprise size.  However, 
enterprise managers report no significant change in production technology toward mass 
production.  Hence, this rapid expansion and group formation must be attributable to 
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factors other than technical change.  Table 3 classifies the sample enterprises into five 
categories according to the timing of the formation of an enterprise group.  An enterprise 
group consists of a parent enterprise and subsidiaries that produce finished goods under the 
same brand name, whether or not they are registered officially as an enterprise group.  The 
timing of group formation is determined by whether the production of subsidiaries was zero 
or positive in the three sample years, i.e., 1990, 1995, and 2000.9  Enterprises that formed 
groups before 1995 were long-established ones, operated by managers with relatively high 
education. 
     Since poor-quality products could be sold in the planned economy and due to the 
thriving new marketplace, many enterprise managers entered the industry with little prior 
knowledge of manufacturing or marketing.  Although specific information on the quality 
of products is unavailable, consumers bought faulty products and complained that they did 
not function well. The managers of long-established enterprises report that none of the 
enterprises had even the simplest instrument for testing their products before shipping.  
Since the apparel and footwear products made in Wenzhou were notorious for their poor 
quality, consumers were likely to have a low opinion of electric appliances made in 
Wenzhou. 
     The main determinant of the rapid growth of this industry in the 1990s is the 
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upgrading of product quality, which began in the mid-1980s when two partners founded an 
enterprise with the novel idea of shipping only after quality inspection.  As Table 4 reports, 
the number of engineers as a proportion of workers increased steadily in the 1990s.  The 
employment of engineers is important for two reasons; first, engineers can improve the 
quality of their products and second, they can organize rapidly expanding production 
needed to meet the increasing demand for products of improved quality.  The average 
number of subcontractors also increased rapidly in the late 1990s.  Although parts 
suppliers existed in the 1980s, their relationship with finished goods producers consisted of 
mainly arm’s length transactions.  In the 1990s, the two parties began to build more 
intimate and longer-term subcontracting relationships.  Based on their accumulated 
experience, these subcontractors were capable of producing high-quality parts. 
The introduction of quality inspection drove the upgrading of marketing activities.  
To avoid intermingling inspected products with defective products, enterprises began to use 
brand names and developed new marketing channels using their own retail shops and sales 
agencies, which dealt only in their products.  As Table 4 indicates, the importance of these 
new marketing channels increased throughout the 1990s whereas the marketplace and local 
traders declined in importance, especially in the late 1990s.  By using local sales agencies, 
even a small enterprise could distribute its products to distant large cities so that the 
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proportion of business done by sales agencies increased more rapidly than that of own retail 
shops during the 1990s.  The largest enterprises had as many as 800 sales agencies 
throughout China by the late 1990s, even though these enterprises put higher priority on the 
development of own retail networks.  The enterprises solve the agency problem associated 
with sales agencies by using local community ties; almost all of their sales agencies are 
merchants from Wenzhou who settled in large cities earlier.10 Thus, the enterprises in 
Wenzhou took advantage of the tradition of out-migration to lower the transaction costs 
associated with the use of sales agencies. 
Table 5 shows the increasing proportions of enterprises adopting new marketing 
strategies beginning in the late 1980s.  The increasing use of sales agencies required the 
establishment of brand names.  In addition, a certificate of national standard or 
international standard, which is granted by the central government body to an individual 
product if it satisfies the appropriate quality standard, validates the high quality of the 
product.  The first enterprise to adopt new market strategies was also the first to form an 
enterprise group.  In this sense, the enterprise is an innovator, even though it was not the 
first to begin quality inspection.  Consistent with merchant-led industrial development, the 
manager of this enterprise was a former salesman.  New marketing strategies were 
adopted by five relatively long-established enterprises, which also formed enterprise groups 
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in the early 1990s following the lead of the innovator.  Among these five enterprises was 
the first enterprise to introduce quality inspection, so that we consider these five enterprises 
plus the innovator to be the leaders of the industry.11 
The leaders formed enterprise groups before other enterprises because the demand 
for their products increased dramatically with the increase in consumers’ recognition of 
their brand name.  While many enterprises were still producing poor quality products, the 
leaders were selling high quality products under brand names through networks of sales 
agencies or in their own retail outlets.  Moreover, they noticed the effect that their 
expanded scale of marketing activities had on increasing total sales.  To exploit this size 
effect, the leaders began to form enterprise groups through mergers.  A manager of a large 
group reports that, among small enterprises, the relatively high-performing ones were the 
first to recognize the importance of size.  Hence, these profitable ventures became 
subsidiaries of larger enterprises early, whereas many other small enterprises resisted 
mergers at first but eventually became subsidiaries after suffering large losses. 
Table 6 classifies the other enterprises into followers, laggards, and converts.  
Some enterprises introduced original strategies regarding labor management, recruitment 
and factory operation in addition to quality improvement and marketing.  Other 
enterprises chose to stay in the low-quality segment of the market.  However, the majority 
 20 
of the enterprises adopted the leaders’ strategies, at least partially, and the followers simply 
imitated the leaders.  Converts are defined as enterprises that became subsidiaries of other 
enterprises by 2000.  Both the followers and the laggards were independent enterprises in 
2000, but they differ in that the followers formed enterprise groups in the late 1990s 
whereas the laggards did not have subsidiaries by 2000.  Thus, the classification in this 
table is identical to that in Table 3 in which enterprises are classified according to the 
timing of group formation.  As Table 3 reports, leaders operate for longer periods and are 
founded by more-educated managers, which is consistent with the case studies discussed in 
Section 2.   
According to Table 6, except for the innovator, the leaders had a remarkably high 
proportion of workers that were engineers, especially in 1990.  Engineers help improve 
product quality and upgrade production processes.  In 1990, these enterprises had the 
lowest average profit margin defined as the ratio of operating profit to sales revenue, but 
improved to record the highest averages in 1995 and 2000.  In the early 1990s, the leaders 
increased their share of sales revenue earned through agencies and in their own retail 
networks, and increased product variety more rapidly than any other enterprise type.  The 
number of product specifications was increased to attract sales agencies that had to satisfy 
varied consumer preferences.  Although data on the number of product specifications may 
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be inaccurate because the method of counting specifications is likely to be different among 
enterprises, the substantial increase in product variety indicates fierce competition for 
market share.  In the late 1990s, the followers began to increase their share of the new 
marketing channels and the number of product specifications dramatically. 
Figure 2 plots the growth in average enterprise size of the leaders omitting the 
innovator, the followers, the laggards, and the converts relative to the innovator.  
Enterprise size is measured by value added, including subsidiaries in the case of enterprise 
groups.12 Interestingly, all enterprises, except for the innovator, were of similar sizes in 
1990, despite the fact that the leaders had much higher proportions of workers that were 
engineers.  Due to the efforts of the engineers to improve product quality and upgrade 
production processes, the leaders grew rapidly in the early 1990s and surpassed the 
innovator by 1995.   
Thus, it seems clear that a major innovation took place in the low-voltage electric 
appliance industry in Wenzhou around 1990, which was followed by imitation throughout 
the 1990s.  It is also clear that some imitators were successful, while others were not.  In 
the next section, we will attempt to explore statistically what management strategies were 
conducive to the successful performance. 
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4. The Empirical Specification 
     In our analysis of quality improvement, the profit margin falls immediately after an 
enterprise improves its product quality due to increased costs without increased sales 
revenue initially.  Indeed, these enterprises may cut prices to attempt to increase market 
share and gain a reputation for product quality.  Over time, the gap between the perceived 
quality and the actual quality narrows as the enterprise gains a reputation for high quality 
products and sales revenues increases.  We measure performance as value added with 
subsidiaries included in an enterprise group.  We also consider the causes and effects of an 
increase in the share of the new marketing channels.  Although this variable reflects an 
enterprise’s efforts to expand its marketing network, it may also be related to its 
performance in that potential sales agencies choose suppliers based on their reputations.   
     We specify the following reduced-form regressions. 
 Vi = 0 + VVi + CCi + MMi + EEi + XiX + ui ,         (1) 
Ci = 0 + VVi + CCi + MMi + EEi + XiX + vi ,         (2) 
Mi = 0 + VVi + CCi + MMi + EEi + XiX + wi ,         (3) 
where V is the logarithm of value added, C is the percentage share of the new marketing 
channels, and M is the profit margin.  The variables with primes on the right-hand side of 
the equations are lagged by five years.  In addition, E is the proportion of workers who 
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were engineers, X is a vector of characteristics of the manager, e.g., occupational 
background and schooling years, and u, v, and w are disturbance terms.  These equations 
are estimated for two periods separately because the coefficients are expected to change 
over time.  In the Appendix, we report the results of regressions in which we pool the two 
periods and control for unobserved heterogeneity among enterprises. 
     Table 7 displays the expected effects of the lagged dependent variables and the 
employment of engineers separately for the leaders and other enterprise types and for the 
two periods.  The leaders had hired more engineers to improve the quality of products and 
production processes by 1990, which should promote sales and contribute to high profits in 
the first period.  Hence, E, E, and E are expected to be positive.  An initially thin profit 
margin should contribute to increases in value added, the share of new marketing channels, 
and profit margin so that M, M, and M should be negative.  An increase in the share of 
the new marketing channels should increase value added, as the positive sign of C 
indicates.  Since the relative sizes of the leaders and their marketing channels do not 
change much from 1990 to 1995, V and C should be positive.  Unlike the leaders, other 
enterprises did not act to improve product quality in the first period.  Their relative sizes 
were unchanged, new marketing channels were not explored, and profit margins remain as 
before.  Hence, the expected signs of V, C, and M are all positive but no other 
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coefficients should be significant for the non-leaders.   
     By 1995, the gap between the perceived quality and the actual quality had narrowed 
for the leaders.  In the second period, leaders are able to reap the benefits of their quality 
reputation.  Hence, the lagged effects of value-added and increased share of new 
marketing channels should have positive effects on all three dependent variables.  
However, the effects of the lagged profit margin and the share of engineers are ambiguous 
for the leaders because aggressively low pricing and the employment of engineers are no 
longer important strategies.  The followers and some of the laggards imitated the leaders 
by improving product quality and upgrading both their production processes and their 
marketing strategies.  Hence, the signs of the coefficients for the other enterprises in the 
second period should be the same as those for the leaders in the first period with an 
important exception.  The other enterprises could improve product quality and upgrade 
production process through imitation without increasing E as much as the leader had in the 
early 1990s.  Hence, although positive, the significance of E, E, and E are expected to 
be lower. 
Although we cannot test these expected differences between leaders and 
non-leaders because we have only six leaders in our sample, we can compare combined 
effects between the two periods.  Since the expected signs of M are opposite for leaders 
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and non-leaders, we assume the profit margin effect to be ambiguous.  For the other 
coefficients, the expected signs are clear from Table 7. To summarize, we have three 
testable hypotheses.  First, value added and the share of new marketing channels increased 
with the initial employment of engineers in the early 1990s, but these effects became 
weaker in the late 1990s because imitation reduced the importance of engineers in 
upgrading quality and improving production processes.  Second, an initially thin profit 
margin contributed to growth in value added and increases in the share of new marketing 
channels in both periods, but its contribution to profit margin became stronger in the later 
period.  Third, the positive effects of value added increase over time because of the 
reputation effect.   
 In the reduced-form equations, all explanatory variables are predetermined or 
exogenous so that endogeneity is not a concern.  Although ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
appropriate for estimating equations (1) and (3), it is inappropriate for equation (2) because 
the dependent variable is censored.  Hence, we use the one-limit tobit method for the first 
period and the two-limit tobit method for the second period.  In the tobit estimation, we 
must consider possible biases due to heteroskedasticity.  The variance of the disturbance 
term is likely to be greater for smaller enterprises, for which the dependent variable can be 
affected more easily by even a slight change in the number of sales agencies and own retail 
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outlets.  To cope with this problem, we adopt the multiplicative tobit method and assume 
that the variance takes the form denoted by i = exp(0 + 1Vi), where the coefficient 1 is 
expected to be negative. 13 
 
5.  Estimation Results  
Tables 8 and 9 present the estimated coefficients for each period separately.14 In the 
first period, the employment of engineers has a positive and highly significant effect in each 
equation as expected.  However, profit margins do not have the expected negative effect 
either on value added or on the share of the new marketing channels if the employment of 
engineers is included in the regressions. However, without the engineer variable, profit 
margins have negative and significant effects, which may be attributable to correlation 
between these two variables.  Perhaps low profit margins for the leaders are associated 
with the high employment of engineers in 1990.   
     The effect of lagged profit margin is positive and significant on the profit margin if 
the engineer variable is included but insignificant otherwise.  The effect of profit margins 
is positive due to the behavior of non-leaders.  As expected, the share of the new 
marketing channels has a positive and significant effect on value added.  Most dummy 
variables representing the managers’ former occupations are insignificant indicating that 
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prior experience in commerce, which is the default category, was not particularly 
advantageous even though the majority of new entrants to the industry were former 
merchants in the early 1990s.  The only meaningful exception is the positive effect of 
managerial experience in developing new marketing channels.  Finally, the positive and 
significant effect of the years of schooling on value added indicates the importance of 
education in organizing production efficiently. 
The effects of value added and the share of the new marketing channels in 1990 on 
the corresponding variables in 1995 are positive and significant as expected.  If all the 
enterprises had grown at the same rate regardless of their initial sizes, these coefficients 
would have been unity.  Since they are significantly smaller than unity, smaller enterprises 
grew faster than larger ones.  From Figure 2, the innovator was by far the largest 
enterprise in 1990 but the other leaders became larger and the followers began to catch up 
by 1995.  Table 8 provides three reasons for the leaders’ high growth during this period, 
namely, large employment of engineers relative to enterprise size, a low-price policy, and 
their managers’ relatively high education.   
     For the regressions in columns (i), (iii), and (v) of Table 9, the full sample of 
enterprises is used.  However, the converts are not equivalent to other enterprises with 
respect to selling products through the distribution channels of their principal enterprises.  
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Hence, this table also reports regressions in which the converts are excluded in columns (ii), 
(iv), and (vi).  Without the converts, the t-statistics are generally smaller due to the 
reduction in the sample size but the qualitative results are similar.  The coefficients in 
Table 9 are considerably different from those in Table 8.  The coefficient for value added 
in the value added equation is equal to unity.  The effects of initial value added on both the 
share of the new market channels and profit margins are now positive and significant, while 
the effect of new marketing channels on value added is also positive and significant.  
These results support our third hypothesis that the positive effects of value added increase 
due to reputation effects in the later period.  The negative and significant effects of initial 
profit margins on the three dependent variables are consistent with our second hypothesis 
that predicts a stronger effect of lower profit margin in the later period.  The effects of the 
employment of engineers are no longer significant, as the first hypothesis asserts.  
Although the employment of engineers contributes to the improvement of product quality 
in the long run, this contribution decreases over time as the imitation of high-quality 
products becomes easier.  The other differences between periods are the positive effect of 
the engineer dummy and the negative and significant effect of the years of top management 
on value added in the later period suggesting that engineering expertise and new 
management leadership became more important as the industry developed.   
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     To summarize our empirical results, the employment of engineers lost its importance 
and the contribution of initially thin profit margins to growth performance became stronger 
over time.  Hence, the imitation of product quality and of better production processes is 
evident as is strategic pricing.  Moreover, as the leaders’ reputations became established, 
the reputation effect strengthened.  Enterprises that failed to imitate high quality products 
or marketing strategies were forced to abandon their own brand names and to become 
subsidiaries of large enterprises.  As a result, enterprise groups grew rapidly and reaped 
the returns on their past investment in reputation.  Our empirical results support this 
explanation of the explosive expansion of industry in the late 1990s in Wenzhou.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
     Wenzhou had a unique set of initial conditions; hence, the replicability of Wenzhou’s 
rapid industrial development in other poor rural areas is an important issue.  To assess this 
possibility, we investigate the basics characteristics of the Wenzhou model by focusing on 
the evolutionary development of the low-voltage electric appliance industry.  In 
developing countries, the evolutionary process of industrial development begins with the 
imitation of easy-to-produce items rather than with product innovation, once a market has 
been identified.  Similarly, the entry of many small enterprises occurred after the 
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construction of a local marketplace in Wenzhou.  However, as these enterprises expanded 
beyond the local marketplace, marketing expertise became important because of the high 
transaction costs associated with these activities in all of the less-developed and transition 
economies.  We find that the ratio of former merchants among new entrants increased in 
Wenzhou.  Therefore, the Wenzhou experience confirms the critical roles of marketplaces 
and merchants in the early stage of industrial development. 
     As the number of enterprises producing poor-quality products increases, their market 
becomes saturated so that improved product quality is profitable and inevitable.  Whether 
the major innovation requires engineering knowledge or marketing expertise hinges on the 
nature of the product of the industry.  In technologically simple industries in remote areas, 
such as in Wenzhou, marketing expertise is particularly important because improving 
product quality is easier than marketing the improved product.  Moreover, in less 
developed areas, poor-quality products prevail so that asymmetric information will be a 
serious problem.  Hence, investment in reputation and other marketing strategies will be 
indispensable.  Our paper demonstrates that the introduction of new marketing strategies, 
such as the use of brand names and exclusive sales agencies by a former merchant and their 
imitation by a number of followers were crucial to the growth of the industry.  Therefore, 
merchant-led industrial development characterizes the Wenzhou model, and can be 
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replicated in other parts of the developing world that have a tradition of commerce.  
 
Appendix: Panel Regressions 
To check the robustness of the estimation results reported in Tables 8 and 9, we use 
panel data to estimate regressions in which we control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
enterprises.  We modify equations (1) through (3) in the following manner:  
Yit = 0 + 1Vit + 2StVit + 3Ct + 4Mit + 5StMit + 6Eit + 7StEit + i + 8St + it,    
where Yit is the dependent variable, i.e., Vit, Cit, or Mit, the subscript t indicates year 1995 or 
2000, St is a second-period dummy which is zero for 1995 and one for 2000, i is the 
enterprise effect capturing both observed and unobserved characteristics of enterprises, and 
it is an error term.  Interaction terms, i.e., SV’, SM’, and SE, are included to capture the 
changes in the effects of value added, profit margin, and engineer employment, which were 
predicted by the hypotheses and confirmed in Tables 8 and 9.  We use both a fixed-effects 
estimator and a random-effects GLS estimator.  Although consistent estimators for 
dynamic panel data are found in the literature, e.g., Baltagi (1995), these techniques are not 
applicable to our data because the number of time-series observations is too small.  
Furthermore, the limited nature of the dependent variable in the new marketing channel 
equation must be ignored due to the small sample size. 
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     The estimated coefficients are reported in Table A1.  The full sample is used in the 
first two columns for each dependent variable, but the sub-sample that excludes converts is 
used in the third column.  The effects of lagged value added on the three dependent 
variables are positive and generally significant; the interaction term between value added 
and the second-period dummy is positive with one exception.  Hence, support for the third 
hypothesis is confirmed.  Consistent with the second hypothesis, the profit margin has 
negative effects on value added and the new marketing channel share.  Moreover, the 
coefficient for the interaction term of the profit margin and the second-period dummy is 
negative and highly significant, which supports the assertion that the effect of low profit 
margin is stronger in the later period.  According to the first hypothesis, the employment 
of engineers should have positive effects on value added and the new marketing channel 
share, but the interaction term should be negative.  Although the fixed-effects estimates of 
these effects are not statistically significant, the random-effect estimates in columns 1 and 4 
do support this hypothesis.   
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Notes 
1.  We thank Yujiro Hayami, Michiki Kikuchi, Justin Y. Lin, Scott Rozelle, Deqiang Liu, 
Michael Kevane, John Bonin and four anonymous referees for very helpful comments.  
We also thank Paul Kandasamy and Mayuko Tanaka for their editorial advice and 
assistance.  
2.  According to Li (1997), Wenzhou had as many as 528 specialized markets, of which 
114 markets specialized in different parts, materials, and machines for industrial production 
and construction and the rest dealt in consumption goods.  
3.  The qualitative pattern of development in the garment and footwear industries did not 
differ substantially from that in the low-voltage electric appliance industry. 
4.  Thus, this paper neglects the inter-enterprise division of labor even though we think 
that it plays an important role in the development of the industry. 
5  Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka (2002) find a similar tendency in a cluster of garment 
enterprises in the northern part of Zhejiang Province. 
6.  Describing twelve successful entrepreneurs in Wenzhou in the 1980s, Zhang (1989) 
points out that many had worked for other factories in the past. 
7.  Smyth and Lu (2000) discuss the formulation of large enterprise groups in the late 
1990s. 
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8.  No enterprise in the sample originated as a subsidiary. 
9.  In most cases, the year of group formation is earlier than the year in which the 
enterprise was registered officially as a group.   
10.  The use of migrant merchants as sales agencies is common in garment, footwear, 
and many other industries in Wenzhou (Wang, 1996). However, this arrangement is not 
practiced by garment enterprises in some other areas according to our interview with the 
sales manager of a garment enterprise in Wuhan in Hubei Province. 
11.  By 1990, the enterprise that first introduced quality inspection was separated into two 
enterprises so that we classify both of these as leaders. 
12.  Since some subsidiaries supplied parts to their parent enterprises, total sales revenue 
is an inappropriate measure of size.   
13.  Greene (2000) provides details of this method. 
14.  The condition number of the moments matrix X’X, where X is the matrix of the 
explanatory variables, is much less than 20 for each period and for each set of explanatory 
variables used in the regressions.  Hence, no serious multicollinearity exists in the data.  
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of Enterprise Founders 
 
Before 
1980 
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1995-2000 
No. of enterprises 4 32 30 36 10 
Years of schooling 8.0 9.8 10.0 10.5 10.9 
Occupation (%)      
 Farmers 50 12.5 6.7 2.8 0 
 Factory workers 0 25 16.7 16.7 10 
 Salesmen or 
traders 
25 25 43.3 63.9 50 
 Engineers 0 3.1 13.3 5.6 0 
 Managers 0 9.4 10 5.6 10 
 Others 25 25 10 5.6 30 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 1990 1995 2000 
Number of enterprises 66 102 112 
Number of independent 
 Enterprises 
66 96 73 
Sales revenue 320.4 964.1 9525.7 
Value added 123.7 375.8 3671.4 
Number of employees 46.7 104.1 338.3 
Capital stock  372.0 983.9 7922.1 
Notes: 
(i) Production and employment sizes reported are averages of the existing sample enterprises 
in each year.  Although some of the sample enterprises had subsidiaries, the numbers 
shown here do not include subsidiaries. 
(ii) The data on enterprise sizes refer only to the independent enterprises. 
(iii) Values are in real terms using 2000 prices as a base and measured in 10,000 yuan.  The 
deflator is the ex-factory price index for the electric machinery and equipment industry 
compiled by the Statistical Bureau of Zhejiang Province (Zhejiang Statisitical Yearbook, 
various years). 
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TABLE 3 
Enterprises Group Formation 
 
Before 
1990 
Early 
1990s 
Late  
1990s 
Not until 
2000 
Merged  
by 2000 
No. of enterprises 1 5 20 47 39 
Established year 1986 1982 1987 1990 1990 
Years of schooling of 
managers 
13 13.0 10.9 10.4 10.4 
Notes: 
(i) Enterprises in the second-to-last columns were independent at least until 2000 and had not 
formed enterprise groups. 
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TABLE 4 
Characteristics of Enterprises  
 1990 1995 2000 
Proportion of workers that 
are engineers (%) 
1.5 2.7 4.2 
Number of parts supplying 
subcontractors  
0 2.8 34.8 
Composition of marketing channels (%)   
Local wholesale market 23.5 20.4 3.6 
Wenzhou traders 26.5 23.8 5.7 
Sales agencies 22.0 30.7 50.6 
Own retail outlets 9.5 12.6 27.1 
Other channels 18.5 12.5 13.0 
Notes: 
(i) The proportion of workers that are engineers is a weighted average with the share of each 
enterprise’s employment in the total employment of the independent enterprises as 
weights. 
(ii) The composition of marketing channels is a weighted average with the ratios of each 
enterprise’s sale to the total sales of the independent enterprises as weights. 
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TABLE 5 
New Marketing Strategies 
 1990 1995 2000 
Full-scale use of sales 
agencies 
12.9 42.7 56.0 
Use of brand name 50.0 72.9 98.6 
Certification of national 
standard 
43.5 72.9 91.8 
Certification of 
international standard 
4.8 15.6 54.8 
Notes: 
(i) The table reports the proportion of sample enterprises adopting the designated strategy. 
(ii) This sample does not include subsidiaries.   
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TABLE 6 
Classification of Enterprises 
 
Leaders Followers Laggards Converts 
Innovator Others  
Proportion of workers that were engineers (%) 
  1990 2.4 7.2 1.9 0.9 0 
  1995 2.7 5.7 2.1 2.1 1.6 
  2000 2.5 5.7 3.6 2.6 2.7 
Profit margin (%)      
   1990 15.9 -0.02* 0.05 11.9 13.4 
   1995 16.1 18.9 10.3* 14.9 14.5 
   2000 16.1 20.2 16.6 11.9* 14.0 
Number of product specifications     
  1990 50 25 79 22 70 
  1995 900 1424 405 48 84 
  2000 1500 7960 2840 156 182 
Share of the new marketing channels (%)   
  1990 60 8 3.9 3.5 1.1 
  1995 55 58 16.4 6.2 5.5 
  2000 70 79 60 18.9 NA 
Notes: 
(i) Enterprises are classified according to the timing of the formation of an enterprise group. 
(ii) The symbol * indicates that the enterprise type had the lowest average in that particular 
year. 
(iii) The average in the last column is taken over the converts that were independent in the 
particular year. By definition the converts did not have sales networks because they were 
subsidiaries in 2000.   
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TABLE 7 
Expected Signs of Coefficients 
 1990 - 1995 1995 - 2000 
Eq. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Leaders 
(i) 
Others 
(ii) 
Leaders 
(iii) 
Others 
(iv) 
(1) 
Value 
added 
V + + + + 
C +  + + 
M    
E +   (+) 
(2) 
Share of 
new 
marketing 
V   +  
C + + + + 
M    
E +   (+) 
(3) 
Profit 
margin 
V   +  
C   +  
M  +   
E +   (+) 
Notes: 
(i) A positive (negative) sign indicates that the effect is expected to be positive (negative) and 
statistically significant. 
(ii) The symbol (+) indicates that the effect is expected to be positive but only weakly 
significant at best. 
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TABLE 8 
First-Period Regression Analysis   
Dependent Variable ln(value added) 1995 
New marketing 
channel share 1995 (%) 
Profit margin 1995 (%) 
 OLS Multiplicative tobit OLS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
ln(value added) 1990 0.555** 
(3.98) 
0.639** 
(4.52) 
- 2.800 
(- 0.64) 
0.033 
(0.00) 
- 0.826 
(- 1.16) 
- 0.469 
(- 0.66) 
New marketing 
  channel share 1990 (%) 
0.019 
(1.46) 
0.027* 
(1.95) 
1.103** 
(4.55) 
1.172** 
(3.14) 
 0.053 
(1.11) 
0.091 
(1.47) 
Profit margin 1990 (%) - 0.013 
(- 1.02) 
- 0.036** 
(- 3.18) 
- 0.130 
(- 0.54) 
- 0.627* 
(- 1.74) 
0.149* 
(1.76) 
0.031 
(0.32) 
Employment of 
 engineers 1990 (%) 
0.183** 
(3.30) 
 
3.797** 
(4.01) 
 
0.935** 
(3.01) 
 
Farmer dummy 0.359 
(0.76) 
0.624 
(1.22) 
6.414 
(0.57) 
18.05 
(1.11) 
- 2.227 
(- 0.59) 
- 0.889 
(- 0.25) 
Factory worker dummy - 0.112 
(- 0.26) 
- 0.259 
(- 0.58) 
6.391 
(0.59) 
- 6.916 
(- 0.39) 
- 2.656 
(- 0.92) 
- 3.349 
(- 1.09) 
Engineer dummy - 0.307 
(- 0.52) 
0.044 
(0.07) 
- 27.01 
(- 0.71) 
13.81 
(0.35) 
- 3.526 
(- 1.01) 
- 1.821 
(- 0.51) 
Manager dummy - 0.034 
(- 0.06) 
0.123 
(0.21) 
31.60** 
(2.85) 
36.17* 
(2.09) 
- 5.455 
(- 1.12) 
- 4.702 
(- 1.12) 
Other occupations 
 Dummy 
0.036 
(0.09) 
0.147 
(0.34) 
11.04 
(1.39) 
30.97* 
(2.11) 
- 1.790 
(- 0.68) 
- 0.709 
(- 0.29) 
Years of schooling  0.153** 
(3.09) 
0.120* 
(2.24) 
1.820 
(1.63) 
1.826 
(1.06) 
0.272 
(0.71) 
0.125 
(0.30) 
Years of top  
  Management 
- 0.048 
(- 1.20) 
0.016 
(0.40) 
- 0.382 
(- 0.44) 
1.193 
(0.86) 
- 0.331 
(- 0.94) 
- 0.005 
(- 0.02) 
Constant 1.777* 
(2.11) 
1.532* 
(1.68) 
- 11.22 
(- 0.40) 
- 36.63 
(- 0.83) 
16.18** 
(2.66) 
15.04** 
(2.43) 
Correction for heteroskedasticity      
ln(value added) in 1990 
 
NA NA 
- 1.044** 
(- 3.32) 
- 0.381 
(- 0.88) 
NA NA 
R-squared 0.66 0.57 NA NA 0.20 0.11 
Notes: 
(i) The sample size is 55.  
(ii) In the tobit regressions, 27 observations are left-censored at zero for the share of new 
marketing channels in 1995.   
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
(iv) The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, for a one-sided test.   
 48 
TABLE 9 
Second-Period Regression Analysis  
Dependent Variable ln(value added) 2000 
New marketing 
channel share 2000 (%) 
Profit margin 2000 (%) 
 OLS Multiplicative tobit OLS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
ln(value added) 1995 1.062** 
(13.38) 
1.105** 
(8.82) 
 21.73** 
(3.86) 
10.49* 
(1.96) 
1.079** 
(3.37) 
1.362** 
(3.10) 
New marketing 
  channel share 1995 (%) 
0.014** 
(2.38) 
0.014* 
(1.73) 
0.665* 
(1.91) 
0.725** 
(2.40) 
0.009 
(0.37) 
0.006 
(0.21) 
Profit margin 1995 (%) - 0.059** 
(- 4.11) 
- 0.059** 
(- 3.00) 
- 2.062** 
(- 2.41) 
- 1.520* 
(- 2.00) 
- 0.066 
(- 1.13) 
- 0.118* 
(- 1.69) 
Employment of 
 engineers 1995 (%) 
0.019 
(0.77) 
0.016 
(0.45) 
- 0.120 
(0.08) 
- 0.269 
(- 0.18) 
0.036 
(0.37) 
0.081 
(0.66) 
Farmer dummy 0.364 
(1.08) 
0.563 
(1.27) 
10.97 
(0.61) 
5.200 
(0.35) 
0.553 
(0.41) 
1.374 
(0.88) 
Factory worker dummy - 0.075 
(- 0.29) 
- 0.267 
(- 0.74) 
- 10.64 
(- 0.73) 
- 8.071 
(- 0.65) 
0.122 
(0.12) 
- 0.954 
(- 0.75) 
Engineer dummy  0.698* 
(1.76) 
0.951 
(1.51) 
9.636 
(0.39) 
20.47 
(0.89) 
2.631 
(1.65) 
1.278 
(0.58) 
Manager dummy 0.352 
(0.97) 
0.616 
(1.29) 
24.32 
(1.44) 
13.33 
(0.98) 
- 0.247 
(- 0.17) 
0.996 
(0.59) 
Other occupations 
 Dummy 
0.575* 
(1.91) 
0.757* 
(1.75) 
2.279 
(0.14) 
- 2.823 
(- 0.19) 
1.276 
(1.05) 
0.920 
(0.61) 
Years of schooling  0.021 
(0.57) 
0.063 
(1.21) 
- 1.844 
(- 1.04) 
0.035 
(0.02) 
- 0.069 
(- 0.47) 
0.022 
(0.12) 
Years of top  
  Management 
- 0.043* 
(- 2.01) 
- 0.045 
(- 1.51) 
- 1.781 
(- 1.50) 
- 1.094 
(- 1.07) 
0.016 
(0.18) 
- 0.043 
(- 0.41) 
Constant 1.869** 
(3.32) 
1.155 
(1.40) 
- 49.41* 
(- 1.79) 
- 3.462 
(- 0.14) 
9.563** 
(4.21) 
8.200** 
(2.82) 
Correction for heteroskedasticity      
ln(value added) in 1995 
 
NA NA 
- 0.252* 
(- 1.73) 
- 0.409* 
(- 2.08) 
NA NA 
R-squared 0.82 0.81 NA NA 0.24 0.35 
Number of observations 95 62 95 62 95 62 
Notes: 
(i) The sample size is 95.   
(ii) For the regressions in columns (ii), (iv), and (vi), only the 62 observations that were 
independent enterprises in 2000 are used.   
(iii) In the tobit regression in (iii), 51 observations are left-censored at zero for the share of 
new channels in 2000, and 5 observations are right-censored at 100%.   
(iv) In the tobit regression in (iv), 18 observations are left-censored and 5 observations are 
right-censored.   
(v) The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.   
(vi) The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, for a one-sided test.   
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Table A1.  Pooled Regression Analysis 
Dependent Valiable ln(value added) New marketing channel share (%) Profit margin (%) 
 Random 
effect 
1 
Fixed 
effect 
2 
Fixed 
effect 
3 
Random 
effect 
4 
Fixed 
effect 
5 
Fixed 
effect 
6 
Random 
effect 
7 
Fixed 
effect 
8 
Fixed 
effect 
9 
ln(value added) -5 0.703** 
(6.62) 
0.417** 
(3.18) 
0.500** 
(2.99) 
0.128 
(0.05) 
13.15** 
(3.14) 
18.88** 
(3.90) 
0.299 
(0.51) 
1.798** 
(3.46) 
1.735** 
(3.44) 
ln(value added)-5  
× Second period dummy 
0.150 
(1.43) 
-0.022 
(-0.21) 
0.038 
(0.23) 
8.617** 
(2.78) 
3.934 
(1.19) 
2.933 
(0.60) 
0.669 
(1.14) 
0.436 
(1.06) 
0.812 
(1.61) 
New marketing 
  channel share -5  
0.018** 
(3.52) 
0.014* 
(2.24) 
0.011 
(1.33) 
0.615** 
(4.93) 
-0.476* 
(-2.33) 
-0.397 
(-1.64) 
0.031 
(1.11) 
0.009 
(0.36) 
-0.013 
(-0.52) 
Profit margin -5 -0.026** 
(-2.99) 
-0.014 
(-1.50) 
-0.015 
(-1.31) 
-0.058 
(-0.25) 
-0.599* 
(-1.93) 
-0.698* 
(-2.09) 
0.079* 
(1.66) 
-0.090* 
(-2.35) 
-0.051 
(-1.46) 
Profit margin -5  
× Second period dummy 
-0.040** 
(-2.71) 
-0.059** 
(-3.67) 
-0.072** 
(-3.48) 
-0.726* 
(-1.76) 
-1.403** 
(-2.72) 
-0.795 
(-1.32) 
-0.591** 
(-7.14) 
-1.051** 
(-16.44) 
-1.141** 
(-18.25) 
Employment of 
 engineers -5 
0.108** 
(2.81) 
0.030 
(0.64) 
0.043 
(0.79) 
3.287** 
(3.23) 
-2.157 
(-1.43) 
-1.935 
(-1.23) 
0.448* 
(2.10) 
-0.008 
(-0.05) 
0.038 
(0.23) 
Engineer employment-5 
× Second period dummy 
-0.079* 
(-1.86) 
0.041 
(0.73) 
0.045 
(0.64) 
-3.339** 
(-2.89) 
-0.297 
(-0.17) 
-2.329 
(-1.13) 
-0.306 
(-1.29) 
0.216 
(0.98) 
0.292 
(1.37) 
Second period dummy 0.292 
(0.60) 
1.635** 
(3.27) 
1.380 
(1.66) 
-22.03 
(-1.56) 
4.781 
(0.30) 
38.33 
(1.59) 
4.874* 
(1.81) 
10.60** 
(5.34) 
9.327** 
(3.72) 
Constant 2.257** 
(6.02) 
3.604** 
(7.39) 
3.581** 
(5.14) 
8.218 
(0.73) 
-25.60 
(-1.64) 
-51.07** 
(-2.53) 
11.04** 
(4.65) 
7.848** 
(4.06) 
6.832** 
(3.25) 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.85 0.20 0.53 0.68 0.74 0.88 0.93 
p-value for F test that all 
enterprise effect = 0 
 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Number of enterprises 95 95 62 95 95 62 95 95 62 
Number of observations 150 150 100 150 150 100 150 150 100 
Notes:  
(i) Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
(ii) The symbol * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, for a one-sided test.
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FIG. 1. 
     Index of Real GDP per Capita in the Yueqing Cluster, 
     Wenzhou City, and China, 1978 to 2001 (China in 1978=100) 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2002 (State Statistical Bureau, 2002), Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New Zhejiang (Statistical Bureau of Zhejiang 
Province, 2000), and Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook (Statistical Bureau of Zhejiang Province, 
2000, 2001, and 2002). 
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FIG. 2.  
   Average Value Added by Enterprise Type  
   Relative to the Innovator 
  
Note: For enterprises with subsidiaries, the total value added of the enterprise group is 
considered.  
Year
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